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Abstract
Whether pro-social preferences identified in economic laboratories survive in natural mar-
ket contexts is an important and contested issue. We investigate how fairness in a laboratory
experiment framed explicitly as a market exchange relates to preferences for fair trade prod-
ucts before and after the market experiment. We find that the willingness to buy at a higher
price when higher wages are paid to the worker correlates both with the choice for a fair
trade product before the laboratory experiment and with whether the participants are will-
ing to pay a positive fair trade premium, elicited at the end of the experiment. These results
support the notion that fairness preferences as assessed in laboratory experiments capture
preferences for fair behavior in comparable situations outside the laboratory.
JEL-codes: C91, D01, D91
Keywords: fairness, market experiments, external validity, fair trade
1 Introduction
Laboratory experiments are playing a vital role in reintroducing social preferences and fairness
into economics. Starting in the early 2000s, experiments focusing on pro-sociality and fairness
are being extended to market environments. It is observed that a market frame does not gen-
erally lead to fairness concerns being found irrelevant. A number of papers find that in market
experiments a substantial share of consumers is willing to pay a premium if firms pay workers
a higher wage or reduce negative externalities (Rode et al., 2008; Danz et al., 2012; Bartling
et al., 2015; Pigors and Rockenbach, 2016).1
For the external validity of pro-social behavior observed in market experiments, it is pertinent
whether it correlates with fair behavior in markets outside of the laboratory. Given the relevance
and pervasiveness of market interactions, this constitutes an important case for the debate
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1While Falk and Szech (2013) argue that markets crowd out concerns for fairness, a different interpretation
of their data is provided by Breyer and Weimann (2015).
1
whether concerns for fairness that are frequently observed in the laboratory (Fehr and Schmidt,
2006) generalize to actual field behavior in a meaningful way (Levitt and List, 2007; Camerer,
2015).
In this paper, we provide a direct test of the relationship between market behavior inside
and outside the lab. We elicit choices for, and the willingness to pay for, a fair trade versus a
standard product, then compare this with behavior in a market experiment. The market game
is designed to resemble exactly the situation that motivates the fair trade movement: consumers
have market power, firms compete, and workers receive only a very small share of the surplus
in equilibrium. We employ a simplified version of the market experiment by Danz et al. (2012)
that shares many features with the above-mentioned experiments on fairness in markets, such
as Bertrand competition and externalities on workers who are participants in the experiment.
We investigate whether the willingness of consumers to pay a higher price if firms pay a
higher wage in this experimental market correlates with two measures of fair behavior in natural
markets. First, participants are classified with respect to their choice between a fair trade
chocolate bar and a larger conventional chocolate bar. This choice of chocolate takes place
outside of the lab a few days before the market experiment. It involves a tradeoff between the
chocolate being produced and traded under fair trade standards and the size of the chocolate bar,
thereby resembling everyday choices between fair trade and conventional products. Importantly,
the choice is made before subjects participate in the market experiment. This first measure allows
us to evaluate the correlation between actual fair trade choices and behavior in an abstract
market experiment.
Our second measure yields a different estimate of the fairness preferences of consumers
outside of the lab. We elicit the willingness to pay for both a bar of fair trade and a bar of
conventional chocolate right after the market experiment. From the difference between the two,
we derive the willingness to pay a fair trade premium. While the fair trade premium is elicited
in the lab, it is linked to an actual physical product, thus affecting actual workers just like the
purchase of fair trade or conventional chocolate in a store.
Levitt and List (2007) point to a number of important differences between lab experiments
and behavior outside the lab in the realm of social preference experiments: participants in
the lab know that they are being investigated by the researchers and their decisions may not
remain anonymous; the context as well as the stakes matter for choices and often cannot be
controlled perfectly by the experimenters; the participants are not the same in experiments and
in the relevant natural contexts, plus the choices and time horizons are often restricted in an
artificial manner in experiments. Given these criteria, our two measures of consumer fairness
are complementary. Experimenter scrutiny is possibly felt less in the choice task before the
experiment compared to the elicitation of the fair trade premium in the lab. Both tasks have
in common that student participants are consumers, therefore a relevant group of people, and
the stakes closely resemble those in real-life settings, with real chocolate bars used. Moreover,
the advantage of the first task is that it is not influenced by the lab setting. On the other hand,
the second task involves money to express the preferences and it is easier to implement than
the first, which could make it valuable for future studies. Finally, and importantly, we compare
choices between real consumption goods with choices in an experimental market that shares
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important features with the real market, rather than correlating non-experimental choices to
abstract and context-free experimental games with a somewhat arbitrary connection between
the two. Such exercises may be part of the explanation for the mixed results so far (see Galizzi
and Navarro-Mart́ınez, 2017 for this argument and an overview of studies relating lab with field
evidence on social preferences).
We find that the likelihood of consumers to buy from the firm that pays a higher wage and
asks for a higher price is correlated at the individual level both with the likelihood to choose
fair trade chocolate before the lab experiment and with the willingness to pay a positive fair
trade premium elicited after the market experiment. It further correlates with positive attitudes
toward fair trade and the stated frequency to buy fair trade products, as measured with a
questionnaire at the end of the experiment. These results support the hypothesis that revealed
fairness concerns in an abstract, though not neutrally framed, market experiment are indeed
indicative of the willingness to pay for fair behavior of firms in natural markets. They also lend
support to the claim that laboratory experiments assessing the determinants of fair behavior
in experimental markets provide relevant insights into the determinants of fair behavior in the
field.
We refrain from analyzing the behavior of subjects in the role of firms. The experiment
inherently studies consumer behavior with the purchasing decision of the consumer in the ex-
perimental market closely resembling the fair trade choices that we analyze. The consumer faces
the relatively straightforward decision whether to pay more in order for the worker to receive a
higher wage, which clearly indicates concerns for the worker. Our design is not intended to, and
is not well suited to, study fairness concerns of participants in the role of firms because firms
act in a competitive environment. While consumers have strong market power, firms have only
little. As a result, strategic concerns affect firm behavior.
Our paper is motivated by the controversy about the relevance of pro-social behavior in
the lab for behavior in the field (Levitt and List, 2007; Camerer, 2015). Sports-card trading
(List, 2006) is a prime example of the endeavor to link and compare the field and the lab. Other
examples more closely related to issues of fairness include Fehr and Leibbrandt (2011) and Stoop
et al. (2012) on cooperative behavior of fishermen when dealing with a common pool resource.
A combination of field and lab-in-the-field experiments is used by Carlsson et al. (2014) to study
whether cooperative behavior is stable at the level of the individual. They find strong evidence
of such a correlation over time (a number of years) and over the different experimental formats
for a non-student sample in Vietnam.
Previous research on external validity focuses on aspects of giving and helping behavior, for
example, considering dictator game choices and charitable giving (Benz and Meier, 2008; Franzen
and Pointner, 2013; Winking and Mizer, 2013; Stoop, 2014; Galizzi and Navarro-Mart́ınez, 2017).
While charitable giving is an important activity, market interactions take a larger share of most
people’s time and comprise a larger share of economic activity. Since we expect the external
validity of lab experiments to depend on the exact context, studying the relevance of fairness in
market experiments for the fairness in actual markets appears to be highly relevant.
In addition to linking behavior in the laboratory to actions outside of the lab, our paper also
contributes to the literature on socially responsible or ethical purchases in experimental markets.
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Rode et al. (2008) is the first to establish that experimental consumers are willing to pay a higher
price for the ethically differentiated product involving a donation. Danz et al. (2012) confirm
that a significant fraction of consumers are willing to pay a higher price to support higher wages
for dependent workers. Pigors and Rockenbach (2016) find that in a monopoly market, socially
responsible production (that is, higher wages and higher prices) does not pay for the firm as it
is not rewarded by the consumers. However, it becomes profitable in an oligopoly setting.
Bartling et al. (2015) design an experiment to investigate the claim by Falk and Szech (2013)
that markets erode moral behavior. In experiments conducted in Switzerland and in China, the
study finds that consumers have a persistent preference for “clean” products (without negative
externalities) and are willing to pay a higher price for them. Irlenbusch and Saxler (2015)
design an experiment to distinguish between three properties of markets, namely diffusion of
responsibility, social information, and market framing. They show that all three affect the
fairness of subjects. Finally, moral behavior in individual tasks and in markets is affected in a
similar way by institutional changes, such as the removal of anonymity, monetary incentives etc.
(Kirchler et al., 2016).
A number of studies focus on the coupling of products with charitable donations. In Feicht
et al. (2016), sellers in a Bertrand market can actively bundle their product with a charitable
donation. Consumers are found to purchase from a firm with a higher credible donation only if
price differences are negligible. In a related study by Soetevent et al. (2016) where the amount
donated was less transparent (indicated as a percentage of the price of the good), considerable
social behavior in markets is observed. If the charitable donation is high enough, participants are
willing to pay higher prices than without the bundling, possibly because they overestimate the
amount of money going to the charity. Finally, Etilé and Teyssier (2016) investigate how different
certification technologies affect market efficiency when firms choose charitable donations to be
bundled with their product. They find that market efficiency is enhanced only if the certification
is performed by a third party.
We present our experimental design in the next section and the experimental results in
Section 3. We conclude with a brief discussion.
2 Experimental design and procedures
The experiment consists of three parts. First, we derive a proxy for the participants’ preference
for fair trade chocolate after they have registered for the experiment, but before they come to
the laboratory. Second, the subjects take part in a market game in the lab. Third, we elicit
their willingness to pay for fair trade and conventional chocolate with an incentive compatible
random price mechanism in order to derive the premium they are willing to pay for fair trade.
Our main interest concerns the relation between fairness in the market experiment and the fair
trade choice in the first part as well as the fair trade premium elicited in the third part of the
experiment.
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Part 1: Choice between fair trade and conventional chocolate
In the first part of the experiment, we offer subjects the choice between fair trade and conven-
tional milk chocolate as an additional reward for coming to the experiment. Since fair trade
chocolate is typically more expensive, we offered a choice between one (in half of the sessions
two) slightly larger (125g) bar(s) of conventional chocolate and one standard size (100g) bar of
fair trade chocolate. This was done via email. The email was sent out about two days before
the experiment and had to be answered before the subjects came to the laboratory. The choco-
late was distributed after the experiment. See Appendix A.1 for an English translation of the
recruitment email.
Part 2: Market game in the laboratory
The second part of the experiment is based on a market game consisting of one consumer, two
firms, and one worker. In the game, the consumer can buy up to 10 units of a fictitious homoge-
neous good and for each unit that she buys is redeemed with 20 points from the experimenter.
Each firm is run by one manager and we refer to subjects in this role as firms. There is one
worker who can produce up to 10 units of the good. The worker is an actual participant in the
experiment, but has no choice to make. Having only one worker in each market who represents
the workforce simplifies fair behavior for the consumer who can ignore horizontal equity con-
cerns between workers.2 Firm i = 1, 2 chooses a uniform price per unit pi ∈ [0, 40] and a wage
wi ∈ [0, 40] per unit. It can sell up to 10 units, ni ≤ 10. Wages are paid only for units that are
actually sold. Thus, the worker can receive a wage for up to 10 units and has no costs.
If the consumer buys ni units from firm i that has chosen the price pi and wage wi, she earns
20− pi for each unit, the firm makes a profit of pi−wi and the worker earns wi per unit bought
at this firm. Total earnings of firm i are given by ni(pi − wi). Total earnings of the consumer
are n1(20− p1) + n2(20− p2). Total earnings of the worker are given by n1w1 + n2w2.
The timing of the game is as follows. After the two firms have made their choices, the
consumer is informed about the price and the wage of each firm, (p1, w1) and (p2, w2). The
consumer can buy any combination of integer amounts from the two firms up to 10 units,
n1+n2 ≤ 10. At the end of each period, all market participants are informed about both firms’
prices and wages as well as about the decision of the consumer and their earnings.
Let us consider the equilibria of the stage game when all agents maximize their payoffs.
There are three subgame-perfect equilibria. In each of them, firm i sets wi = 0. The equilibrium
prices are pi = 0, pi = 1, or pi = 2 for i = 1, 2. The consumer buys 10 units from the firm with
the lower price as long as min(p1, p2) < 20, which always holds on the equilibrium path.
3 If
both firms choose the same price (< 20), the consumer buys 10 units, split in an arbitrary way
between the firms. Note that, in equilibrium, almost the entire surplus goes to the consumer.4
2Complex fairness concerns are studied by Danz et al. (2012) where each firm has its own worker.
3Off the equilibrium path, the consumer buys nothing if min(p1, p2) > 20 for both firms and any number of
units if min(p1, p2) = 20.
4As the stage game has three equilibria with pi = 0, pi = 1 or pi = 2, collusive equilibria of the repeated game
exist due to the possibility to punish deviations. However, we do not find evidence of collusive firm behavior.
Moreover, all equilibria involve wages equal to zero. A selfish consumer does not want to pay more for a higher
wage and, thus, a (selfish but collusive) firm has no reason to pay higher wages.
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In contrast, the payoffs are split equally among all four market participants if both firms choose
pi = 15 and wi = 5 and the consumer buys five units from each of the firms. In this case, each
participant earns 50 points. Therefore, we refer to these values as the “fair” price and wage,
respectively.
The market game has the property that as long as the consumer buys 10 units, the total
earnings in the market are constant. In particular, it does not matter for the total earnings from
which firms, and at what prices, the consumer purchases the units. Thus, we can study fairness
concerns of consumers toward workers that are not confounded with efficiency concerns.5
The market game was repeated 20 times with fixed groups of four subjects, and subjects
kept their role of firm, worker, or consumer throughout the entire market game. The payoffs in
all 20 rounds were added to determine the total payment in this part of the experiment. The
exchange rate was 100 points for 1 Euro. In addition, subjects received a show-up fee of 5 Euro
that was added to their earnings.
Part 3: Elicitation of fair trade premium
The third part of the experiment yields a measure of the premium that participants are willing
to pay for fair trade. From each participant, we elicit his or her willingness-to-pay (between
e 0-2) for both fair trade and conventional dark chocolate (WTPfair and WTPconv) by relying
on a random price mechanism (Becker et al., 1964). The participants were asked to state a price
between 0 and 2 Euros where any multiple of e 0.01 was admissible. The random price was
drawn from the uniform distribution of all integer multiples of e 0.01 between 0 and 2 Euros.
Subjects bought a chocolate bar if their stated WTP for the bar was at least as high as the
random price and if this bar was randomly chosen to be sold in the experiment (which was true
only for one of the two bars). If a subject bought the chocolate, he or she paid the random
price, not the stated WTP. The mechanism is incentive compatible for both chocolate bars. The
prices and relevant chocolate types that were drawn are in Table 7 of Appendix C.1.
Two treatments were conducted, one in which the WTPs were stated in private only and
another where the participants stated their WTP publicly. The purpose of this variation was to
study image concerns and the results are reported in Friedrichsen and Engelmann (2018). Their
paper only uses the data from parts 1 and 3 but not from the market game in part 2. In the
present paper, we pool the two treatments of part 3 and check the robustness of our results by
running separate tests and regressions per treatment.6
5Note that consumers have no incentive to signal that they care about fairness if in fact they do not, unless
they want to preserve a positive (self-)image. This is in contrast to other experiments that try to assess the fairness
concerns of players such as ultimatum, trust, and gift-exchange games. In these games, signaling typically increases
the extent of fair behavior in early periods of repeated games, because the presence of a small share of fair players
(or the mere possibility that they exist) makes it possible for selfish players to mimic them. In our experiment,
selfish consumers want to signal that they do not care about the worker but only about low prices.
6For the investigation of how behavior in the market game relates to the actual choices of one of the two
chocolate bars in part 1, pooling the treatments is innocuous because the treatments only begin to differ after the
market game. The main results of Friedrichsen and Engelmann (2018) are that the difference between the stated
WTP for fair trade and for conventional chocolate was higher in the treatment with public choices than in the
treatment with private choices, but this effect is driven exclusively by participants who chose the conventional
chocolate in part 1.
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We chose dark chocolate for part 3 of the experiment instead of milk chocolate as in the first
part. Thereby, we try to limit the potential effect that the WTP is reduced for the second bar
of the same kind of chocolate. Moreover, we offered unknown brands to prevent subjects from
choosing a chocolate only because of its brand and not because of its fair trade label. From the
two WTPs that we elicit, we infer the premium that an individual is willing to pay for the fair
trade chocolate as WTPpremium = WTPfair −WTPconv.
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After entering their WTPs on the computer screen, subjects fill in an extensive question-
naire regarding their attitudes toward and knowledge about fair trade. The answers to this
questionnaire allow us to confirm the validity of our proxies for a preference for fair trade.
Before turning to the results, three remarks regarding the design are in order. First, if fair
trade products are perceived to be of higher quality, those who choose fair trade chocolate might
not only be concerned with the production methods, but might also expect a quality difference.
This could weaken the correlation with pro-social choices in the market experiment, thus poten-
tially leading to us to underestimate the correlation between the behavior in the market game
and the concerns for fair trade. Second, note that even if subjects choose fair trade chocolate or
inflate their willingness to pay for fair trade in order to impress the experimenters, this should
not influence our main measure of interest, namely the relationship of these choices with behav-
ior in a computerized market experiment, unless such experimenter demand is systematically
related to fair behavior in the market experiment. Finally, in our first sessions very few subjects
chose the conventional chocolate. Therefore, we offered a choice between two bars of conven-
tional chocolate and one bar of fair trade chocolate in the following sessions in order to make
the conventional chocolate more attractive. For this reason, our classification into fair trade and
conventional choosers is noisy. This should, however, only reduce any correlations that we find
between choices in the experimental market and choices for one of the chocolate bars.
The experiment was computerized using zTree (Fischbacher, 2007) and took place in the
experimental economics laboratory mLab at the University of Mannheim. Participants were
recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). A translation of the experimental instructions is in
Appendix A.2. We conducted eight sessions with 16-20 participants each, with a total of 144
participants. For part 2 of the experiment, each participant received a show-up fee of e 5; for
part 3, everyone received an additional endowment of e 4. Average cash earnings were e 18.63 in
total, including the show-up fee and the endowment, subtracting the payments for the chocolate
if applicable. In the market game in the first part of the experiment, participants in the role of
firms earned e 4.50 on average, those in the role of workers earned e 6.31 on average, and those
in the role of consumers earned e 23.73 on average. In contrast to the equilibrium with common
7We note that while the random price mechanism (Becker et al., 1964) is incentive compatible in theory,
experimental subjects may misconceive it (Plott and Zeiler, 2005; Cason and Plott, 2014). Such misconceptions
arguably do not matter much in our experiment, because we are not concerned with measuring the WTP per
se, but with checking whether it correlates with behavior in the experimental markets. Hence, misconceptions
would only be problematic if they were systematically related to characteristics that drive fair behavior in the
market experiment. Moreover, we only analyze the fair trade premium, which is the difference of two separately
stated WTPs, such that any misconceptions resulting in level differences cancel out. Nevertheless, there is noise
in the WTPs, as measured by the BDM and, consequently in the fair trade premium. To the extent that there
is, we might underestimate the true correlation between the fair trade premium and the fairness preferences as
exhibited in the market game. Partly due to this noise, though, we also focus on whether the fair trade premium
is positive rather than on its absolute size.
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knowledge of rationality and selfish players where the consumer earns at least e 36, the workers
earn e 0 and the firms earn at most e 2, we observe that the workers are better off than the
firms, and both are better off than predicted while consumers do worse.8
Our dataset contains decisions from 121 subjects who chose between fair trade and conven-
tional chocolate via email as described above and from 23 newly recruited subjects for whom
the chocolate choice was collected in public during a recruitment day and not via email.9 These
144 participants are matched in groups of four so that we have 36 independent groups of one
consumer, one worker, and two firms each. Our main interest lies in the behavior of the 36 con-
sumers, out of whom 13 had chosen the conventional chocolate bar before the experiment and
23 had chosen the fair trade chocolate bar. As each group plays the outlined market game for 20
periods, we have 20 observations per consumer or 720 observations at the market-period level.
Among the consumers are six newly recruited participants who made their chocolate choice on
the recruitment day. Two of these consumers had chosen the conventional chocolate and four
the fair trade chocolate. The results are very similar if we restrict the analysis to those subjects
only who made their choice between chocolate bars via email as shown in Appendix C.5.
3 Experimental results
Our first finding is that the two measures of fair trade preferences outside the laboratory, the
chocolate choice made before the actual laboratory experiment and the willingness to pay a
premium for fair trade as compared to conventional chocolate, are highly correlated with each
other. The stated fair trade premium in part 3 of the experiment is significantly higher on average
for those consumers who chose a fair trade chocolate (average of 30.83 cents, SD = 44.96 cents,
N = 23) than for those who chose a conventional chocolate (average of 2.31 cents, SD = 7.25
cents, N = 13). This difference is highly significant in a two-sided t-test with unequal variances
(p = 0.0066) and the distributions are also significantly different according to a Wilcoxon rank-
sum test (p = 0.0048) with (ex post calculated) power of the mean comparison of 0.8143. Thus,
the probability of not rejecting the null when it is false is below 20%. When we consider the
discretized dummy premium, which takes on a value of 1 if the premium is strictly positive,
we also observe a highly significant positive correlation with the chocolate choice (Spearman’s
ρ = 0.4914, p = 0.0023).
Let us now consider consumer behavior in the market game that subjects played in the
laboratory. Given that the worker has no bargaining power in the market game, we call a
consumer fair if she buys from the firm with the higher wage and higher price. Note that such
behavior leads to a more equal distribution of payoffs on average, since the average wage offered
was 3.33, which is below the fair wage of 5, and the average posted price was 8.98 as compared
to the fair price of 15. We use the same two indicator measures of fair market behavior by
consumers that were used by Danz et al. (2012): BuySomeBW (with BW standing for “by
8In Danz et al. (2012), where there is one worker per firm, the workers are worse off than the firms on average.
9We intended to recruit more subjects in this manner, but were not successful. Overall, 222 students received
a chocolate bar on the recruitment day, but only 23 showed up to one of our experimental sessions. This explains
the low number of subjects in this group. It also indicates that handing out chocolate to motivate students to
sign up for experiments is not a very effective recruitment mechanism.
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wage”) is an indicator of the consumer purchasing at least one unit from the firm offering a
higher wage and asking for a higher price, i.e., wi > wj , pi > pj and qi > 0, conditional on such
a high-wage-high-price offer being available. BuyMoreBW is an indicator of the consumer
purchasing more units at the high-wage-high-price firm (if existing), wi > wj , pi > pj and
qi > qj . We also employ a third, continuous measure where we calculate the fraction of units
that a consumer bought at the high-price-high-wage firm, denoted by FairShare.10 These three
measures allow us to focus on the consumers’ choices and to abstract from the absolute levels
of wages and prices. Note that alternative measures, such as the Gini coefficient to measure
equality of payoffs, are affected by firm behavior and, thus, less suited to isolate consumers’
fairness concerns.
3.1 Fair trade choices and consumer decisions in experimental markets
Let us first consider whether fair consumer choices in the market experiment are related to the
decisions for fair trade chocolate that we elicited in part 1 of the experiment before subjects
came to the lab. We restrict attention to those instances in which fair behavior is possible, i.e.,
markets in which one of the two firms offers a higher wage and asks a higher price than its
competitor. This is the case in slightly less than half of all interactions. The restriction leaves
us with 319 observations, 110 with a consumer who chose conventional chocolate and 209 with
a consumer who chose the fair trade chocolate in part 1. Every consumer faced such an instance
at least three times, and the number of such instances does not differ with respect to the fair
trade choice in part 1. In particular, consumers who had chosen the conventional chocolate faced
a situation where a high-wage-high-price offer was available on average 8.46 times (SD = 3.01,
min = 4, max = 15), and those who had chosen fair trade faced such a situation on average 9.09
times (SD = 3.53, min = 3, max = 16). The equality of the two averages cannot be rejected
(two-sided t-test with unequal variances: p = 0.5900, also the distributions are not significantly
different according to a Wilcoxon rank-sum test: p = 0.6197).
As shown in Figure 1, consumers who chose the fair trade chocolate in the first part are
more likely to act fairly in the market experiment according to all three of our measures (the
averages and standard deviations are collected in Table 8 in Appendix C.2). Based on these
consumer level averages, we compare behavior between those who chose conventional or fair
trade chocolate. While the number of observations appears to be relatively small when we
aggregate the market data to one observation per consumer, i.e., 36 observations, the power
of our tests is good for our main measure BuyMoreBW and is high enough for all measures,
making a sign error unlikely (see Gelman and Carlin, 2014, for a discussion of errors in sign and
magnitude of an effect).11
Those participants who chose fair trade chocolate in part 1 are almost twice as likely to buy
some units at a high-wage-high-price firm, BuySomeBW, than those who chose conventional
10In Appendix C.3, we also consider two additional indicator measures for the sake of the robustness of our
analysis, namely BuyMin50BW and BuyAllBW. BuyMin50BW is an indicator of the consumer purchasing at
least as many units at the high-wage-high-price firm (if existing) as at the competitor, wi > wj , pi > pj and
qi ≥ qj . The results are very similar to those with BuyMoreBW. However, we consider this variable a less
suitable indicator of fair purchasing as the consumer does not favor the high-wage-high-price firm. BuyAllBW






































































(c) Average of FairShare.
Figure 1: Differences of fair purchasing behavior by chocolate choice. N = 36, 13 conventional
choosers, 23 fair trade choosers. The y-axis displays the average of the respective variable over
all consumers, where the variable has been averaged at the consumer level first, taking into
account all situations with a high-wage-high-price firm.
chocolate (54% compared to 30%). However, the variation is relatively large and this difference
is only marginally significant in a two-sided t-test with unequal variances (p = 0.0789) and
the difference between the distribution is insignificant according to a Wilcoxon rank-sum test
(p = 0.1105). When we consider the more stringent measure of fair purchasing, BuyMoreBW, we
find larger differences. Consumers who previously chose the fair trade chocolate are, on average,
5 times as likely to purchase more units from the high-wage-high-price firm than are those
consumers who had chosen conventional chocolate (about 20% compared to about 4%). This
difference is statistically significant in a two-sided t-test with unequal variances (p = 0.0028) and,
additionally, the distributions differ according to a Wilcoxon rank-sum test (p = 0.0153). Finally,
Although not statistically significant, the results are in line with those presented in the main text. We attribute
the absence of a significant effect to the lack of variation in BuyAllBW.
11When we split the sample according to the ex ante choice of a chocolate bar, the power is highest for the
comparison of means of BuyMoreBW with 0.88, indicating that the probability of making a type-2 error is 12%.
For the other measures, it is lower with 0.42 for BuySomeBW, 0.67 for BuyMin50BW, and 0.66 for FairShare. In
the light of the discussions about the possible exaggeration bias in statistically significant findings (e.g., Gelman
and Carlin, 2014; Ioannidis et al., 2017), we acknowledge that our point estimates may somewhat overstate the
true effects. However, given the consistency and size of the estimates across our various measures, we are confident
that the choice of fair trade chocolate indeed correlates significantly positively with fair behavior in our market
experiment.
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Table 1: Probability of fair consumer behavior measured by BuySomeBW and BuyMoreBW
regressed on market characteristics and chocolate choice in part 1.
BuySomeBW BuySomeBW BuyMoreBW BuyMoreBW
coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value
FT 0.2503∗ 0.0461 0.2409∗ 0.0484 0.1724∗∗∗ 0.0003 0.1649∗∗∗ 0.0004
∆p -0.0260∗∗ 0.0076 -0.0158∗ 0.0136
∆w 0.0022 0.8253 0.0159∗ 0.0288
const. 0.3020∗∗ 0.0030 0.4018∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0362 0.0555 0.0536∗ 0.0302
N 319 319 319 319
R2
overall
0.0970 0.1484 0.0577 0.0827
Notes: Random effects model with robust standard errors clustered on subject. FT denotes
choice of fair trade chocolate in part 1 of the experiment. ∆w and ∆p denote the difference
in wages and prices between the two firms. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
if we consider the average number of units a consumer bought at the high-price-high-wage firm
(FairShare), we find that, on average, fair trade choosers in the role of consumers bought 27
percent of their basket at the high-wage-high-price firm, whereas conventional choosers bought
only 11.3 percent at the high-wage-high-price firm. This difference is also statistically significant
(two-sided t-test with unequal variances: p = 0.0203; the distributions differ according to a
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: p = 0.0193).
To investigate the relationship between fair consumer choices in the market experiment and
the choice of a chocolate bar in part 1 of the experiment in more detail, we construct a dataset
that contains all market interactions in which one of the two firms was of the high-wage-high-
price type.12 We estimate random effects regressions with standard errors clustered at the
subject level, reported in Table 1. These analyses take into account that the data contains
multiple observations per consumer and allow us also to control for the cost and benefits of
purchasing at the more expensive firm by including price and wage differences as controls.
The propensity to buy some units from the high-wage-high-price firm, BuySomeBW, is 25
percentage points higher if the subject chose fair trade chocolate compared to conventional
chocolate in part 1. The effect becomes only slightly smaller when we control for wage and price
differences. Similarly, a subject is about 17 percentage points more likely to buy more units
from the high-wage-high-price firm, BuyMoreBW, if the subject chose fair trade chocolate, and
the effect is again only slightly smaller when we include controls.13 If we run a fixed-effects
regression instead of the random effects model, and omit the dummy for the subjects’ chocolate
choice, we find that the estimated individual fixed effect correlates significantly positively with
the decision in favor of the fair trade chocolate bar for both dependent variables, BuySomeBW
12The summary statistics of fair purchasing behavior in this dataset are very similar to the ones above where
we first aggregate the data at the consumer level (see Tables 30 and 31 in Appendix D). We do not report
results from simple parametric or non-parametric tests because these do not appropriately take into account the
clustered nature of the data. Figures 4 and 5 in Appendix D show that any differences at the consumer level are
only stronger in the market-level dataset.
13We find similar results if we estimate a linear probability model, see Table 12 in Appendix C.4. The point
estimates for the FT dummy are larger in absolute terms and significant at the 1-percent level if we include
interaction terms of the price and wage differences with the chocolate choice (see Table 19 in Appendix C.6). The
interaction terms themselves are typically not significant.
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Table 2: Fair consumer behavior measured by FairShare regressed on market characteristics and
chocolate choice in part 1.
FairShare FairShare
coef. p-value coef. p-value
FT 0.1633∗∗ 0.0088 0.1575∗∗ 0.0092
∆p -0.0161∗∗ 0.0057
∆w 0.0090 0.1332





Notes: Random effects model with robust standard errors clustered on subject. FT denotes
choice of fair trade chocolate in part 1 of the experiment. ∆w and ∆p denote the difference
in wages and prices between the two firms. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
and BuyMoreBW among our 36 participants (p < 0.01, using OLS, the p-value only becomes
smaller if we bootstrap the standard errors to account for the fact that the fixed effect is itself
an estimated and therefore noisy dependent variable).
As the dummy variables do not take into account all information available about the relative
weight a consumer puts on purchases at the high-wage-high-price firm, we also analyze purchas-
ing behavior based on the variable FairShare. Note that this variable is missing if a consumer
does not purchase anything, which happens 3 times in our dataset. Table 2 shows that those
who chose the fair trade chocolate bar purchase a significantly larger fraction of their basket
(about 16 percentage points more) at the high-wage-high-price firm.14
In all regressions, we find that consumers react to the costs of being fair because all our
measures of fair behavior decrease significantly in the price difference between the firms. They
react less systematically to the benefits of their actions. While the coefficient for the wage
difference between firms is positive in all regressions, only BuyMoreBW increases significantly
with the wage difference.
3.2 Fair trade premium and consumer decisions in experimental markets
Next, we investigate the relationship between the choices in the experimental market and the
fair trade premium elicited in part 3 of the experiment. Do participants who are willing to
pay more for a fair trade product buy (more units) from the high-wage-high-price firm? We
dichotomize the stated fair trade premium to the indicator premium, because the absolute values
are noisy measures of fair trade preferences due to the treatment effect in the public and private
condition.15 Again, we restrict attention to those instances in which one of the two firms offered
14In Table 13 in Appendix C.4 we show that these results are essentially the same when we use an ordinary
least squares regression instead of the random effects specification, but the point estimate is slightly larger.
15Friedrichsen and Engelmann (2018) show that the fair trade premiums of the conventional choosers are higher
in the public than in the private treatment. In effect, the average fair trade premium in public does not differ
between individuals who chose the fair trade chocolate and those who chose the conventional one in part 1 of the






































































(c) Average of FairShare.
Figure 2: Differences in fair purchasing behavior by premium. N = 36, 16 with a fair trade
premium > 0, 20 with a fair trade premium ≤ 0. The y-axis displays the average of the respective
variable over all consumers, where the variable is averaged at the consumer level first, taking
into account all situations with a high-wage-high-price firm.
a higher wage and asked a higher price than its competitor. The number of such instances does
not differ significantly with the sign of the fair trade premium.16
As shown in Figure 2, consumers who stated a positive fair trade premium are more likely to
act fairly in the market experiment according to all three of our measures. The figure displays the
market choices of the consumers, differentiated by their stated fair trade premium in part 3 (the
relevant averages and standard deviations are shown in Table 9 in Appendix C.2). Participants
with a positive premium are more than twice as likely to buy some units at a high-wage-high-price
firm (61% compared to 26%). This difference is significant in a two-sided t-test with unequal
variances (p = 0.0041) and the distributions differ significantly according to aWilcoxon rank-sum
test (p = 0.0057). The indicator BuyMoreBW shows even larger differences. Consumers with a
positive fair trade premium are substantially more likely to have purchased more units from the
high-wage-high-price firm than those with a zero or negative premium (about 22% compared to
16Consumers whose fair trade premium is positive faced a high-wage-high-price offer 9.6 times on average
(SD = 3.44, min = 5, max = 16), those whose stated fair trade premium was zero or negative faced such an
offer on average 7.94 times (SD = 3.24, min = 3, max = 15). The two averages are not statistically different
at conventional levels (two-sided t-test with unequal variances: p = 0.1458, also the distributions do not differ
significantly according to a Wilcoxon rank-sum test: p = 0.1456).
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about 3%). This difference is highly statistically significant in a two-sided t-test with unequal
variances (p = 0.0014) as is the difference between distributions according to a Wilcoxon rank-
sum test (p = 0.0006). Finally, if we take into account how many units a consumer bought
at the high-price-high-wage firm and average this over all available instances (FairShare), we
find that consumers with a positive premium bought on average 30 percent of their basket at
the high-wage-high-price firm, whereas those with a zero or negative premium bought only 10
percent at the high-wage-high-price firm. This difference is also highly statistically significant
(two-sided t-test with unequal variances: p = 0.0027, also the distributions differ significantly
according to a Wilcoxon rank-sum test: p = 0.0021).17
To study the relationship between the consumers’ behavior in the market experiment and the
fair trade premium in more detail, we use the dataset that contains all market interactions where
one of the firms was of the high-wage-high-price type and estimate a random effects regression
with standard errors clustered at the level of subjects. We regress the measures BuySomeBW
and BuyMoreBW on a dummy for a positive fair trade premium (premium) and market charac-
teristics. From Table 3, it can be taken that the coefficient of the premium dummy is significantly
different from zero and economically relevant in size for both measures, BuySomeBW and Buy-
MoreBW.18 The incidence of BuySomeBW is about 34 percentage points higher on average for
a consumer with a positive fair trade premium and the incidence of BuyMoreBW is about 17
percentage points higher than for a consumer with a weakly negative fair trade premium. In-
stead of the random effects model, we also run a fixed-effects regression and omit the dummy for
a positive premium. We find that the estimated individual fixed effect correlates significantly
positively with having a positive fair trade premium both for BuySomeBW and for BuyMoreBW
in our sample of 36 consumers (p = 0.001, using OLS with standard errors; the same holds if we
bootstrap standard errors to account for the estimated dependent variable).
Table 3: Probability of fair consumer behavior measured by BuySomeBW and BuyMoreBW
regressed on market characteristics and an indicator of a positive fair trade premium in part 3.
BuySomeBW BuySomeBW BuyMoreBW BuyMoreBW
coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value
premium 0.3491∗∗ 0.0022 0.3369∗∗ 0.0025 0.1839∗∗∗ 0.0007 0.1739∗∗ 0.0011
∆p -0.0258∗∗ 0.0099 -0.0156∗ 0.0224
∆w 0.0019 0.8534 0.0153∗ 0.0469
const. 0.2670∗∗ 0.0019 0.3677∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0415 0.1615 0.0609+ 0.0713
N 319 319 319 319
R2
overall
0.1153 0.1667 0.0600 0.0844
Notes: Random effects model with robust standard errors clustered on subject. ∆w and ∆p
denote the difference in wages and prices between the two firms. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, **
p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
17When we split the sample according to the incidence of a positive fair trade premium, the power is highest
for the comparison of means of BuyMoreBW with 0.93. It is 0.85 for BuySomeBW, 0.77 for BuyMin50BW, and
0.88 for FairShare.
18The results are very similar when we use a linear probability model, see Table 14 in Appendix C.4 and with
interaction terms, see Table 19 in Appendix C.6.
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As the WTP in the third part of the experiment is announced privately or in public, depend-
ing on the treatment, we also conduct the analysis for both treatments separately. We find that
our findings hold in both the private and the public treatment and, moreover, the estimated
coefficients for the fair trade premium are nearly identical in both treatments (see Tables 27 and
28 in Appendix C.9). Thus, a positive premium is associated with a higher propensity to buy
from the high-wage-high-price firm.
We also analyze whether purchasing behavior based on the variable FairShare correlates with
the stated fair trade premium in part 3 of the experiment. Table 4 shows that those with a
positive fair trade premium purchase a significantly larger fraction of their basket (about 18
percentage points more) at the high-wage-high-price firm than those with a weakly negative fair
trade premium.19
Table 4: Fair consumer behavior measured by FairShare regressed on market characteristics and
an indicator of a positive fair trade premium in part 3.
FairShare FairShare
coef. p-value coef. p-value
premium 0.1939∗∗ 0.0016 0.1849∗∗ 0.0021
∆w -0.0159∗∗ 0.0084
∆p 0.0087 0.1624





Notes: Random effects model with robust standard errors clustered on subject. Premium is
an indicator of a positive fair trade premium in part 3. ∆w and ∆p denote the difference in
wages and prices between the two firms. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
3.3 Attitudes toward fair trade
After the experiment, we administered a questionnaire to learn about individual attitudes,
knowledge, and motivations with respect to fair trade. The questionnaire contained 25 state-
ments for which the participants had to indicate their level of agreement.20 The questionnaire
is designed to cover the most important arguments in favor and against supporting fair trade,
important facts about the fair trade principles, and potential purchasing motivations.
We find that choices observed in part 1 of the experiment reflect the stated purchasing
behavior and attitudes. Those participants who chose fair trade chocolate report to buy fair
trade products more frequently and in the aggregate reveal a more positive attitude regarding
fair trade (see Figure 3 in Appendix B.1).
Next, we use an exploratory factor analysis to determine linear combinations of the origi-
nal questionnaire statements that can be used to summarize the response behavior with fewer
19In Table 15 in Appendix C.4 we show that these results are essentially the same when we use ordinary least
squares regressions instead of the random effects specification but the point estimate is slightly smaller in the
OLS. Furthermore, in Table 29 we conduct the random effects analysis separately for each treatment. Again, our
results hold for both treatments.
20A translation of the questionnaire is contained in Appendix A.3.
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variables without losing much information. It turns out that the questionnaire data can be
explained by three latent factors.21
As factor 1 loads on attitudes toward fair trade and its effect on farmers and the market,
in our interpretation it measures the attitude that fair trade is an effective tool to do good
and to transfer money to the poor. Thus, we label factor 1 shopping helps. Factor 2 is called
social pressure because it characterizes individuals who report purchasing fair trade products
not out of intrinsic interest but because of image concerns or in order to conform with the
wishes of family or friends. Factor 3 mostly loads on questions that do not represent value
statements but agreement with a relatively narrow interpretation of fair trade as a system that
is focused on above-market level prices and pre-financing. We call factor 3 fair trade knowledge.
We investigate how these factors correlate with the behavior in the market game, the chocolate
choice, and the stated fair trade premium. The detailed results from the regressions with the
set of attitudes are collected in Appendix C.7.
The attitudes measured by our questionnaire support the interpretation that both the fair
trade choice and the stated premium relate to real fair trade preferences. The decision in favor
of the fair trade chocolate bar correlates positively with the belief that purchasing fair trade
products is a good thing (shopping helps) although this correlation is significant only for the
sample of those who stated their chocolate choice via email (see Table 20). The fair trade
premium also correlates positively and significantly with shopping helps (see Table 21). In
contrast, being influenced by image concerns and peers (social pressure) does not significantly
correlate with the fair trade choice or the stated fair trade premium, and neither does the factor
related to fair trade knowledge. This is consistent with the observation that factor 2 mostly
reflects social motivations to purchase fair trade and factor 3 (fair trade knowledge) captures
knowledge about fair trade. Neither of the two must necessarily be correlated with intrinsic
preferences for or against fair trade, which are captured mostly by factor 1.
Regarding decisions in the experimental market, the analysis reveals that those consumers
who believe in fair trade as an effective tool to help farmers (high values of shopping helps) are
more likely to purchase more than 50 percent of their basket at a high-wage-high-price firm in
the market experiment (see Table 23). In addition, we find that the factor fair trade knowledge,
which captures the association of fair trade with above market prices and not with judgements
regarding its function to help farms for example, correlates negatively with the probability to
buy at least some units from the high-wage-high-price firm (see Table 23) and negatively with
the share purchased at the high-wage-high-price firm (FairShare, see Table 24). These findings
further support the notion that behavior in the abstract market experiment relates meaningfully
to attitudes and behavior regarding fair trade in markets outside of the lab.
21The factor analysis finds a set of q common factors such that linear combinations of the q factors reconstruct
the p original variables. The coefficients of the factors in the linear combination are called factor loadings. We
employed a maximum-likelihood factor analysis and selected the model with three factors because it had a lower
value on Schwarz’s BIC than alternative models with fewer or more factors. Our interpretation of the factors
relies on a varimax rotation. Details are provided in Appendix B.2.
16
4 Discussion
Our results suggest that even a relatively abstract market experiment is suitable for measur-
ing fairness preferences that are relevant for consumption choices outside of the lab. This is
demonstrated both by a correlation of choices in the market experiment with fair trade choices
before the experiment and with the willingness to pay a price premium for a fair trade product
over a conventional product after the experiment. The subjects’ answers to a post-experimental
questionnaire further support the hypothesis that fair (trade) choices in the laboratory and
before the experiment reflect fair trade preferences in the field. In summary, abstract market
experiments have external validity regarding the consumers’ preferences for ethical consumption
and, thusly, are a relevant and practical tool to investigate market behavior and market-relevant
fairness concerns of consumers. This underlines the relevance of the lively debate on markets
and morals that is fueled by experimental evidence (Falk and Szech, 2013; Bartling et al., 2015;
Breyer and Weimann, 2015; Pigors and Rockenbach, 2016).
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Appendix
A Instructions and questionnaire
A.1 Recruitment email asking for chocolate choice
Below is the English translation of the text of the email that was sent to participants before
the experiment to elicit their fair trade choice. The subject line was “additional information for
experiment (date/time)”.
Dear participants of the experiment,
For your participation in this experiment, you will receive a bar of chocolate in addition. How-
ever, you have to choose the type before the experiment.
Two types of chocolate are on offer:
- conventional milk chocolate, 125g
- fair trade milk chocolate, 100g
Please send an email with your choice before the experiment to ..@... Simply put “conventional”
or “fair trade” in the subject line.
A.2 Instructions (translated from German)
Below is the English translation of original instructions. Participants received the instructions
for the second part only after the first part had been completed. (Note that the first part of
the experiment corresponds to part 2 as described in the paper while the second part of the
experiment corresponds to part 3.)
Instructions
Welcome to this experiment! You can earn money and the amount that you will receive depends
on the choices you and other participants will make.
Please read these instructions carefully. If you do not understand something, please raise
your hand. We will answer your questions individually. The instructions are identical for all
participants.
Overview
This experiment consists of two parts. The second part will take less time to complete than the
first one. You will receive the instructions for the second part after the first part is completed.
Your choices in the second part will have no influence on the results of other participants and
likewise the choices of other participants cannot influence your result.
The first part of the experiment
We now describe the first part of the experiment in detail. Your choices in this part will remain
anonymous. This means that no participant of the experiment can attribute the observed choices
to other participants.
The first part of the experiment consists of several rounds. Before the first period, each
participant will be randomly assigned the role of a firm, a worker, or a consumer. These roles
are only relevant in the first part of the experiment. Until the end of this part of the experiment,
the assigned roles will remain the same. You will know your own role, but will not know which
roles the other participants have been assigned. Two firms, one worker and one consumer (four
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participants in total) will form a group. During the whole first part of the experiment this group
will remain the same. This means that the participants in the role of the firms, the worker, and
the consumer in your group will be the same in each round.
The roles
Both firms produce an identical good. Both can each produce a maximum of ten units of the
good. How many units will actually be produced in a firm depends on how many units the
consumer wants to buy from this firm.
The worker can be fully or partly employed by both firms. Without the worker, a firm cannot
produce anything. Each firm determines the wage that the worker receives per unit sold. You
can think of the participant in the role of the worker as representing the workforce.
Both firms offer the good to the same consumer. The consumer can buy a maximum of ten
units of the good and can decide how much he wants to buy from which firm.
The participants’ payoffs are measured in points and depend on their role:
• The worker receives the wage paid to him by the firms. This wage is a piece rate, that
is, the worker receives a fixed wage per unit sold by each firm. The worker himself has
no decision to make. If the consumer does not buy anything from either firm, the worker
receives no wage and thus has a payoff of zero.
• The firm receives the price multiplied by the quantity of units she has sold to the consumer,
minus the wage payment to the worker. If the consumer does not buy anything at the
firm, the firm must not pay any wage and also earns zero profits.
• The value that the consumer attaches to one unit of the good is equal to 20 points. He
can buy a maximum of 10 units, but may also buy less. This means that he receives 200
points minus the total price, if he buys 10 units of the good. If he buys less than 10 units
of the good, he receives the quantity of units multiplied by 20 minus the total price he has
to pay for them. If a consumer does not buy anything, he receives a payoff of zero.
Examples
1. Firm 1 sets a wage of 7 and a price of 9. Firm 2 sets a wage of 2 and a price of 18. The
consumer buys 6 units from firm 1 and 2 units from firm 2. The payoffs are as follows:
• consumer: (20–9) ∗ 6 + (20–18) ∗ 2 = 11 ∗ 16 + 2 ∗ 2 = 70
• firm 1: 6 ∗ (9–7) = 6 ∗ 2 = 12
• firm 2: 2 ∗ (18–2) = 2 ∗ 16 = 32
• worker: 6 ∗ 7 + 2 ∗ 2 = 46.
2. Firm 1 sets a wage of 4 and a price of 18. Firm 2 sets a wage of 1 and a price of 8. The
consumer buys 7 units from firm 1 and 3 units from firm 2. The payoffs are as follows:
• consumer: (20–18) ∗ 7 + (20–8) ∗ 3 = 2 ∗ 7 + 12 ∗ 3 = 50
• firm 1: 7 ∗ (18–4) = 7 ∗ 14 = 98
• firm 2: 3 ∗ (8–1) = 3 ∗ 7 = 21
• worker: 7 ∗ 4 + 3 ∗ 1 = 31.
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Procedure
Each round in the first part of the experiment proceeds as follows:
1. Both firms determine the wages they will pay the worker for each unit sold, and the prices
at which they want to sell each unit of the good. The piece rate as well as the price must
lie in the interval between 0 and 40 points.
2. The consumer is informed about the prices of both firms and about the piece rate paid to
the worker by each of them. Then he decides how many units he wants to buy from each
firm.
3. The purchases are completed.
4. The choices and payoffs of all participants are displayed on the computer screen.
This procedure is repeated 20 times.
The payoffs
The final payoff from the first part of the experiment is the sum of payoffs from all rounds.
The exchange rate for the points which you earn in the course of the experiment is 100 points
= e 1.
At the beginning you will receive a fixed payment of e 5. If you make losses, these will be
deducted from the fixed amount.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand. We will then answer your questions in
private.
Quiz
Please answer the following short questions. This helps us to make sure that all participants
have understood the instructions before we begin with the first part of the experiment.
1. The roles will be reassigned in each round  Yes  No
2. I will be matched to the same participants throughout the entire first part of the experiment
 Yes  No
3. If firm 1 sets a price of 16 and a wage of 2, firm 2 a price of 15 and a wage of 13, and the
consumer buys 10 units from firm 1 and 0 units from firm 2, then the payoffs are:
• consumer: .
• worker: .
• firm 1: .
• firm 2: .
4. If firm 1 sets a price of 9 and a wage of 9, firm 2 a price of 14 and a wage of 1, and the
consumer buys 3 units from firm 1 and 2 units from firm 2, then the payoffs are:
• consumer: .
• worker: .
• firm 1: .
• firm 2: .
22
Instructions for the second part of the experiment
In the second part of the experiment, you are asked to make two simple decisions and answer a
brief questionnaire.
For the second part of the experiment, you will receive e 4 in addition to your earnings from
the first part. You can spend part of this e 4 to purchase a bar of chocolate.
Purchase of chocolate
Purchasing the chocolate takes place according to the following mechanism:
• There are two types of chocolate, one is fair trade, the other one conventional. Both will
be shown to you before you make your decision.
• Please state your maximal willingness-to-pay for each type of chocolate on the screen.
Your willingness-to-pay must lie between e 0 and e 2, and you can choose any amount in
cents in this interval.
• Only your willingness-to-pay for one of the two types of chocolate will be payoff relevant.
Thus, you will receive at most one bar of chocolate. The relevant type of chocolate is
determined randomly and you will learn which one it is only after you have made your
decisions. The same type of chocolate is payoff relevant for all participants.
• Before it is been determined which type of chocolate is payoff-relevant, the price for the
chocolate bar is drawn at random. This price is the same for all participants and is
independent of the type of chocolate. The price is between e 0 and e 2, and any amount
in cents is equally likely.
• If your maximum willingness-to-pay for the relevant type of chocolate is at least as high
as the randomly drawn price, you obtain one bar of this type of chocolate and the price is
subtracted from the e 4 that you received for the second part of the experiment. If your
stated maximum willingness-to-pay is lower than the randomly drawn price, you will not
receive a bar of chocolate and you do not pay anything; thus you keep your e 4.
Please note that your stated willingness-to-pay does not influence the price of the chocolate,
but only whether you will get a bar or not. Therefore, you should state how much you would
like to pay at most for the respective type of chocolate. Then you will receive the chocolate
whenever you do not have to pay more for it than what you are willing to pay for it, and you
do not receive the chocolate bar whenever you would have to pay more than your maximum
willingness-to-pay.
Example 1:
You state a maximum WTP of e 0.13 for fair trade chocolate and of e 1.93 for conventional
chocolate. Suppose the randomly determined price is e 0.78. If fair trade is drawn to be payoff
relevant, you obtain e 4 but no chocolate bar because your stated maximum willingness-to-pay
of e 0.13 is lower than the price of e 0.78. If the conventional chocolate is chosen to be payoff-
relevant instead, you receive a bar of conventional chocolate and you pay e 0.78. In this case,




You state a maximum WTP of e 1.34 for fair trade and of e 0.62 for conventional chocolate.
Suppose the randomly determined price is e 0.44. If fair trade is chosen to be payoff-relevant,
you receive a bar of fair trade chocolate and you pay e 0.44. In this case, you obtain e 4 - e 0.44
= e 3.56 and a bar of fair trade chocolate for this part of the experiment. If the conventional
chocolate is chosen to be payoff-relevant instead, you receive a bar of conventional chocolate
and you pay e 0.44. In this case, you obtain e 4 - e 0.44 = e 3.56 and a bar of conventional
chocolate for this part of the experiment.
The examples show that you cannot influence the price with your stated willingness-to-pay
(in example 2, you pay the same price in both cases even though the maximum willingness-to-pay
is different), but only whether you obtain a bar of chocolate (as in example 1).
Questionnaire
After all participants have entered their willingness-to-pay for both types of chocolate, we ask
you to fill in a brief questionnaire on the screen.
Distribution of chocolate (private treatment)
After filling in the questionnaire, you will first be informed about the randomly drawn price
and reminded of your stated willingness-to-pay for both types of chocolate. You will then be
informed which type of chocolate is payoff relevant and whether you will receive a bar or not.
At the end of the experiment you receive the bar of chocolate in case that you get one, together
with the money that you earned in the experiment, in the room next door. None of the other
participants will learn whether you receive a bar of chocolate, your willingness-to-pay for it, nor
how much money you obtain.
Distribution of chocolate (public treatment)
After filling in the questionnaire, you will first be informed about the randomly drawn price and
reminded of your willingness-to-pay for both types of chocolate. Each of you will then be asked
individually to announce your maximum willingness-to-pay for both types of chocolate.
You will then be informed which type of chocolate is payoff relevant and whether you will
obtain a bar.
If your stated willingness-to-pay for the payoff-relevant type of chocolate is at least as high
as the price, you will be asked to come to the front of the room to pick up your bar of chocolate.
You will receive the money that you earned in the experiment in the adjacent room. None
of the other participants will learn how much money you receive.
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A.3 Questionnaire about fair trade (translated from German)
For each of the following statements, subjects were asked to express their agreement on a scale
from -3 (do not agree at all) to +3 (fully agree) if not stated otherwise.
1. The higher prices of fair trade products only benefit the firms while the producers of the
raw materials and the farmers do not profit.
2. Fair trade products are a good opportunity to secure a decent income for individuals in
poor countries.
3. Fair trade distorts competition and hinders the development of alternative industries in
countries who are dependent on the export of coffee, cocoa or bananas.
4. I purchase fair trade products (in this case possible answers range from “never” 0 to “often”
3).
5. I am prepared to pay higher prices for fair trade products.
6. I would purchase more fair trade products if these were available at lower prices.
7. The quality of fair trade products in comparison to conventional products is typically (in
this case possible answers range from “much worse” -3 to “much better” +3).
8. I am prepared to accept a lower quality when choosing fair trade products.
9. Fair trade products should be available in all conventional supermarkets and discounters.
10. Discounters offering fair trade products are a contradiction to the ethical principles of fair
trade.
11. The information available about fair trade is (in this case answer possibilities range from
“very unsatisfactory” -3 to “very satisfactory” +3)
12. I consider the following criteria of fair trade (in this case possible answers range from “not
important at all” -3 to “particularly important” +3).
(a) strengthening of peasants
(b) improvement of working conditions
(c) fair trade minimum price
(d) fair trade premium on top of minimum price
(e) prefinancing of harvests
(f) reduction of chemicals used in farming
(g) ban of GMO organisms.
13. I purchase fair trade products (or would possibly purchase fair trade products)
(a) because I want to do something good when shopping.
(b) because producers of conventional products often receive only very low prices.
(c) because fair trade products are typically more environmentally friendly.
(d) because it conforms with my image.
(e) because my family finds it important.
(f) because these products taste better.
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B Analysis of questionnaire data
B.1 Results from questionnaire regarding fair trade
Responses to the questionnaire (see Section A.3 in the Appendix) support the validity of our
classification into fair trade and conventional choosers. Figure 3a shows the difference in pur-
chasing behavior according to statement 4 from the questionnaire (p = 0.0009 in a Wilcoxon
rank-sum test). In addition, we construct an aggregate measure of an individual’s attitude to-
ward fair trade by summing the answers to all attitudinal statements, i.e., to statements 1 to
11 from the questionnaire. As statements 1, 3, and 6 are written in a way such that agreement
reveals a negative attitude toward fair trade, responses to these statements enter with a negative
sign. The higher the value of the aggregate measure, the more positive is an individual’s attitude
toward fair trade. Figure 3b shows that fair trade choosers are much more positive about fair





















(a) Reported frequency of purchasing fair trade
products (statement 4). Answer possibilities


























(b) Aggregate measure of attitudes toward fair
trade. Sum of responses to statements 1 to 11,
where 1, 3 and 6 enter with a negative sign.
Figure 3: Differences in purchasing behavior and in stated attitude toward fair trade based on
questionnaire (see Section A.3). N = 144, 44 conventional choosers and 100 fair trade choosers.
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B.2 Factor analysis of questionnaire data
Table 5: Selection of number of factors for factor analysis using maximum likelihood
2 factors 3 factors 4 factors
Schwarz’s BIC 762.427 748.554 768.378
Table 6: Factor loadings
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Uniqueness




high price 0.7150 0.4652
cheaper 0.8085






working conditions 0.5162 0.3419 0.5766
minimum price 0.7817 0.3513
premium 0.8520 0.2270
prefinancing 0.3314 0.4777 0.6372
chemicals 0.5015 0.7158
GMO 0.4198 0.7398
doing good 0.5722 0.6013





taste 0.4446 0.4710 0.5744
Notes: Blanks represent factors loadings with an absolute value smaller than 0.3. The
column “uniqueness” states which percentage of the variance for the particular variable is
not explained by the common factors.
27
C Additional tables and results
C.1 Results of random price procedure (BDM mechanism) in part 3
For part 3 of the experiment, the payoff-relevant chocolate turned out to be conventional and
fair trade in half of the sessions each. Details about the (randomly chosen) prices at which
chocolates were sold are collected in Table 7. In total, we handed out conventional chocolate to
22 subjects and fair trade chocolate to 21 subjects.
Table 7: Prices drawn and number of chocolate bars sold to participants
conventional fair trade
price in e 0.26 0.27 0.97 1.85 0.25 1.01 1.20 1.78
treatment public private private public public private public private
#participants 16 16 20 20 16 16 20 20
#bars sold 11 9 2 0 12 2 7 0
% of participants 68.8 56.3 10 0 75 12.5 35 0
C.2 Fractions of consumers with fair choices in market experiment by fair
trade choice and fair trade premium
Table 8: Average of BuySomeBW and BuyMoreBW and FairShare at the consumer level split
by their fair trade choice in part 1 of the experiment.
BuySomeBW BuyMoreBW FairShare N
conv. 0.3019 0.0368 0.1135 13
(0.3753) (0.0717) (0.0454)
FT 0.5378 0.1923 0.2694 23
(0.3627) (0.2083) (0.0447)
Notes: FT and conv. denote choice of fair trade and conventional chocolate, respectively.
Standard deviations in parentheses. The variables have been averaged at the consumer level
first, taking into account all situations with a high-wage-high-price firm.
Table 9: Average of BuySomeBW and BuyMoreBW and FairShare at the consumer level split
up by the fair trade premium stated in part 3 of the experiment being positive or not.
BuySomeBW BuyMoreBW FairShare N
premium ≤ 0 0.2569 0.0346 0.1033 16
(0.3382) (0.1047) (0.1634)
premium > 0 0.6092 0.2174 0.3009 20
(0.3424) (0.1995) (0.2036)
Notes: Standard deviations in parantheses. The variables have been averaged at the con-
sumer level first, taking into account all situations with a high-wage-high-price firm.
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C.3 Alternative measures of fair purchasing behavior
In addition to the measures discussed in the main text, we analyze two additional measures of fair
consumption. The indicator BuyMin50BW takes the value 1 if a consumer purchases at least
half of her total purchases in a given market at the high-wage-high-price firm, wi > wj , pi > pj
and qi ≥ qj . The indicator BuyAllBW takes the value 1 if a consumer purchases all units
at the high-wage-high-price firm, wi > wj , pi > pj and qi > 0, qj = 0. As can be taken from
Table 10, BuyMin50BW is a relatively frequent behavior whereas BuyAllBW is rare. The raw
differences that we expect to see based on the chocolate choice of the participant as well as based
on the fair trade premium being positive are clearly visible for these measures too.
We obtain results very similar to those presented in the main text based on the indicator
BuyMin50BW. This purchasing behavior is almost three times as likely in the group of consumers
who chose the fair trade chocolate bar than among those who had chosen the conventional
chocolate bar (about 12% compared to about 32%). This difference is also statistically significant
in a t-test (p = 0.0188) and the distributions are also significantly different according to a
Wilcoxon rank-sum test (p = 0.0307). The difference with respect to the sign of the fair trade
premium is also large and significant. BuyMin50 is almost three times as likely in the group
of consumers with a positive premium than among those with a weakly negative one (about
12% compared to about 35%). This difference is also highly statistically significant in a t-
test (p = 0.0088) and the distributions are also significantly different according to a Wilcoxon
rank-sum test (p = 0.0050).
When we consider the indicator BuyAllBW, the results are qualitatively in line with those
reported based on other measures. However, as we would expect for such a rare behavior in a
small sample, we do not find a statistically significant relationship (chocolate choice: p = 0.0861
in a two-sided t-test with unequal variances and p = 0.1900 in a Wilcoxon rank-sum test,
premium: p = 0.3978 in a two-sided t-test with unequal variances and p = 0.3814 in a Wilcoxon
rank-sum test). While ex-post power calculations are problematic, we note that a calculation
for the mean comparison of BuyAllBW is 0.40 if we split the sample by chocolate choice and is
0.13 if we split the sample according to the sign of the premium.
Regression results based on a random effects model that used all 319 market interactions
where one firm was of the high-wage-high-price type confirm the results from the simple tests
for both, BuyMin50BW and BuyAllBW, as shown in Table 11.
Table 10: Average of BuyMin50BW and BuyAllBW at the consumer level split up by the
chocolate choice in part 1 of the experiment (upper panel) or by the fair trade premium stated
in part 3 of the experiment being positive or not (lower panel).
BuyMin50BW BuyAllBW N
conv. 0.1185 0.0118 13
(0.0524) (0.0427)
FT 0.3188 0.0633 23
(0.0618) (0.1270)
premium ≤ 0 0.1177 0.0284 16
(0.2208) (0.0820)
premium > 0 0.3495 0.0578 20
(0.2797) (0.1236)
Notes: FT and conv. denote choice of fair trade and conventional chocolate, respectively.
Standard deviations in parentheses. The variables have been averaged at the consumer level
first, taking into account all situations with a high-wage-high-price firm.
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Table 11: Probability of fair consumer behavior measured by BuyMin50BW and BuyAllBW,
regressed on market characteristics and chocolate choice in part 1.
BuyMin50BW BuyMin50BW BuyAllBW BuyAllBW
coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value
FT 0.2134∗∗ 0.0089 0.2048∗ 0.0112 0.0486 0.1015 0.0473 0.1054
∆p -0.0223∗∗ 0.0078 -0.0024 0.3521
∆w 0.0176+ 0.0823 0.0052 0.1420
const. 0.1198∗ 0.0256 0.1584∗∗ 0.0076 0.0141 0.2980 0.0083 0.4204
N 319 319 319 319
R2
overall
0.0602 0.0958 0.0083 0.0096
Notes: Random effects model with robust standard errors clustered on subject. FT denotes
choice of fair trade chocolate in part 1 of the experiment. ∆w and ∆p denote the difference
in wages and prices between the two firms. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
C.4 Consumer decisions in market experiment and chocolate choice or fair
trade premium - OLS regressions
While the main text presents results from random effects models, all our results hold up in
simple OLS regressions. As the data contains multiple observations per consumer, we consider
the random effects model more appropriate. As discussed in the main text, fixed effects models
yield similar conclusions. They are less tractable as we first have to estimate the consumer fixed
effects and then investigate the relationship between the estimate fixed effects and the chocolate
choice or fair trade premium, respectively.
Table 12: Probability of fair consumer behavior measured by BuySomeBW and BuyMoreBW
regressed on market characteristics and chocolate choice in part 1 (OLS).
BuySomeBW BuySomeBW BuyMoreBW BuyMoreBW
coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value
FT 0.3273∗ 0.0138 0.3113∗ 0.0148 0.1837∗∗∗ 0.0009 0.1734∗∗ 0.0012
∆p -0.0304∗∗∗ 0.0002 -0.0171∗∗ 0.0087
∆w 0.0060 0.5556 0.0141+ 0.0610
const. 0.3091∗∗ 0.0075 0.4213∗∗∗ 0.0006 0.0364+ 0.0733 0.0661∗ 0.0202
N 319 319 319 319
R2 0.097 0.149 0.058 0.083
Notes: Linear probability model with robust standard errors clustered on subject. FT
denotes choice of fair trade chocolate in part 1 of the experiment. ∆w and ∆p denote the
difference in wages and prices between the two firms. p-values in second column. + p < 0.1,
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 13: Fair consumer behavior measured by FairShare regressed on market characteristics
and chocolate choice in part 1 (OLS).
FairShare FairShare
coef. p-value coef. p-value
FT 0.1840∗∗ 0.0078 0.1738∗∗ 0.0084
∆p -0.0189∗∗∗ 0.0006
∆w 0.0066 0.2506
const. 0.1229∗ 0.0195 0.1832∗∗ 0.0011
N 316 316
R2 0.088 0.141
p-values in second column
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: Linear probability model with robust standard errors clustered on subject. FT
denotes choice of fair trade chocolate in part 1 of the experiment. ∆w and ∆p denote the
difference in wages and prices between the two firms. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01,
*** p < 0.001.
Table 14: Probability of fair consumer behavior measured by BuySomeBW and BuyMoreBW
regressed on market characteristics and an indicator of a positive fair trade premium in part 3
(OLS).
BuySomeBW BuySomeBW BuyMoreBW BuyMoreBW
coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value
premium 0.3465∗∗ 0.0070 0.3324∗∗ 0.0071 0.1819∗∗ 0.0036 0.1714∗∗ 0.0049
∆p -0.0299∗∗ 0.0026 -0.0169∗ 0.0210
∆w 0.0045 0.6989 0.0135 0.1032
const. 0.3150∗∗ 0.0034 0.4279∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.0472 0.1532 0.0780+ 0.0633
N 319 319 319 319
R2 0.115 0.167 0.060 0.085
Notes: Linear probability model with robust standard errors clustered on subject. ∆w and
∆p denote the difference in wages and prices between the two firms. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05,
** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Table 15: Fair consumer behavior measured by FairShare regressed on market characteristics
and the fair trade premium stated in part 3 (OLS).
FairShare FairShare
coef. p-value coef. p-value
premium 0.1791∗ 0.0119 0.1695∗ 0.0130
∆w -0.0188∗∗ 0.0043
∆p 0.0060 0.3773
const. 0.1358∗ 0.0125 0.1966∗∗ 0.0010
N 316 316
R2 0.089 0.142
Notes: OLS regression with standard errors clustered on subject. Premium is an indicator
of a positive fair trade premium in part 3. ∆w and ∆p denote the difference in wages and
prices between the two firms. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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C.5 Fair consumer behavior, chocolate choice, and fair trade premium - ex-
cluding 23 newly recruited participants
The sample used for all estimations in the main body of the text comprises participants who
made their chocolate choice either privately via email (121 participants, 30 consumers) or in
public during a recruitment day (23 participants, 6 consumers). All our findings are unaffected
by re-estimation on the sample that excludes participants who made their chocolate choice
during the recruitment day. The sample of newly recruited participants alone is too small to
allow for a separate analysis of this group. Note that we would have liked to have a larger pool
of these subjects but were unable to get these people to the laboratory, see footnote 9.
Excluding the participants from the recruitment day is arguably reasonable for the analysis
of the relationship between the pre-experiment chocolate choice and the market behavior. Since
the chocolate choice was made in different situations for those who made it via email and those
who made it on recruitment day, the classification might work differently. For example, for
those who made the chocolate choice on the recruitment day, it may have been affected by
additional motives such as image concerns toward other students who are present or because
there is direct interaction with the experimenter. As can be seen from comparing Tables 16 and
(the left half of) 17 with Tables 1 and 2 in the main body of the text, respectively, excluding
the participants from the recruitment day leads to marginally weaker results, but the effects of
the pre-experimental fair trade choice remain significant except for the one on BuySomeBW.
For the analysis of the relationship between behavior in the market experiment and the
fair trade premium, excluding the participants from the recruitment day appears to make less
sense, because experimental choices were identical for participants from both pools. Hence
there is no reason to believe that there are systematic differences between the two subject
pools with respect to these measures. For the sake of completeness, however, we also report
robustness checks for the relationship between market behavior and the fair trade premium for
the sample restricted to the participants who made their chocolate choice via email. As seen
when comparing Tables 18 and (the right half of) 17 with Tables 3 and 4 in the main body of the
text, respectively, excluding the participants from the recruitment day leads to partly marginally
weaker and partly marginally stronger estimated coefficients for the dummy of a positive fair
trade premium, results, with all coefficients remaining significant at the 5%-level.
Table 16: Probability of fair consumer behavior measured by BuySomeBW and BuyMoreBW
regressed on market characteristics and chocolate choice in part 1.
BuySomeBW BuySomeBW BuyMoreBW BuyMoreBW
coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value
FT 0.2206 0.1188 0.2094 0.1295 0.1743∗∗ 0.0015 0.1674∗∗ 0.0018
∆p -0.0250∗ 0.0223 -0.0169∗ 0.0295
∆w -0.0004 0.9720 0.0172∗ 0.0384
const. 0.3365∗∗ 0.0039 0.4385∗∗∗ 0.0003 0.0429∗ 0.0497 0.0593∗ 0.0480
N 274 274 274 274
R2
overall
0.0807 0.1242 0.0563 0.0837
Notes: Random effects model with robust standard errors clustered on subject. FT denotes
choice of fair trade chocolate in part 1 of the experiment. ∆w and ∆p denote the difference in
wages and prices between the two firms. Regression excludes 23 newly recruited participants.
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 17: Fair consumer behavior measured by FairShare regressed on market characteristics
and the chocolate choice in part 1 or an indicator of a positive fair trade premium in part 3.
FairShare FairShare FairShare FairShare
coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value
FT 0.1488∗ 0.0328 0.1424∗ 0.0356
premium 0.1894∗∗ 0.0052 0.1774∗∗ 0.0081
∆p -0.0168∗ 0.0161 -0.0165∗ 0.0213
∆w 0.0088 0.1951 0.0082 0.2420
const. 0.1337∗∗ 0.0084 0.1743∗∗∗ 0.0009 0.1261∗∗ 0.0073 0.1699∗∗∗ 0.0004
N 271 271 271 271
R2
overall
0.0719 0.1224 0.0824 0.1293
Notes: Random effects model with robust standard errors clustered on subject. FT denotes
choice of fair trade chocolate in part 1 of the experiment. Premium is an indicator of a
positive fair trade premium in part 3. ∆w and ∆p denote the difference in wages and prices
between the two firms. Regression excludes 23 newly recruited participants. + p < 0.1, *
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Table 18: Probability of fair consumer behavior measured by BuySomeBW and BuyMoreBW
regressed on market characteristics and an indicator of a positive fair trade premium in part 3.
BuySomeBW BuySomeBW BuyMoreBW BuyMoreBW
coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value
premium 0.3207∗ 0.0112 0.3061∗ 0.0144 0.1953∗∗ 0.0017 0.1819∗∗ 0.0031
∆p -0.0246∗ 0.0272 -0.0163∗ 0.0442
∆w -0.0010 0.9264 0.0158+ 0.0680
const. 0.3043∗∗ 0.0011 0.4073∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0467 0.1592 0.0684+ 0.0745
N 274 274 274 274
R2
overall
0.0987 0.1437 0.0647 0.0890
Notes: Random effects model with robust standard errors clustered on subject. Premium is
an indicator of a positive fair trade premium in part 3. ∆w and ∆p denote the difference in
wages and prices between the two firms. Regression excludes 23 newly recruited participants.
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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C.6 Fair consumer behavior, chocolate choice, and fair trade premium - with
interactions
Table 19: Probability of fair consumer behavior measured by BuySomeBW and BuyMoreBW
regressed on market characteristics and chocolate choice in part 1 or an indicator of a positive
fair trade premium in part 3.
BuySomeBW BuyMoreBW BuySomeBW BuyMoreBW
coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value
FT 0.3571∗∗ 0.0079 0.2039∗∗ 0.0013
premium 0.4006∗∗∗ 0.0004 0.1729∗∗ 0.0060
∆p -0.0258∗ 0.0220 -0.0279∗ 0.0172 0.0017 0.8602 -0.0031 0.7298
∆w 0.0235+ 0.0773 0.0231+ 0.0858 0.0024 0.6507 0.0009 0.8581
∆p× FT -0.0010 0.9522 0.0021 0.8993 -0.0221+ 0.0921 -0.0157 0.2087
∆w× FT -0.0369∗ 0.0397 -0.0358∗ 0.0456 0.0165 0.1937 0.0199 0.1290
const. 0.3359∗∗∗ 0.0007 0.3399∗∗∗ 0.0001 0.0219 0.3783 0.0549 0.1366
N 319 319 319 319
R2
overall
0.1442 0.1503 0.0903 0.0878
Notes: Random effects model with robust errors clusters on subject. FT denotes choice of
fair trade chocolate in part 1 of the experiment. Premium is an indicator of a positive fair
trade premium in part 3. ∆w and ∆p denote the difference in wages and prices between the
two firms. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
C.7 Regressions using latent attitudes from the factor analysis
Table 20: Regressions of the chocolate choice on attitudes
choice of fair trade chocolate
coef. p-value coef. p-value
shopping helps 0.0955 0.2261 0.1668+ 0.0790
social pressure 0.0787 0.3861 0.0614 0.5429
FT knowledge 0.0632 0.5276 0.0252 0.8327
const. 0.6319∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.6228∗∗∗ 0.0000
N 36 30
R2 0.082 0.138
Notes: OLS regression. Column 1 includes all consumers, column 2 excludes 6 consumers
who were newly recruited participants during a public recruitment drive. + p < 0.1, *
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 21: OLS regressions of willingness-to-pay differences on attitudes
fair trade premium premium> 0
all private public all private public
coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value
shopping helps 0.1253∗ 0.0354 0.1983+ 0.0846 0.0588 0.3124 0.2557∗∗∗ 0.0009 0.2299+ 0.0678 0.2535∗ 0.0210
social pressure -0.0135 0.8391 0.0070 0.9441 -0.1168 0.1532 -0.0183 0.8229 0.0769 0.4820 -0.2348 0.1027
FT knowledge -0.1258+ 0.0944 -0.1471 0.1794 0.1363 0.2356 -0.0405 0.6541 -0.0872 0.4537 0.1463 0.4570
const. 0.1976∗∗ 0.0025 0.2841∗ 0.0188 0.1010 0.1171 0.5380∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.5324∗∗∗ 0.0004 0.4812∗∗∗ 0.0004
N 36 18 18 36 18 18
R2 0.201 0.339 0.264 0.300 0.303 0.446
Notes: OLS regression. Columns 1-3 have the stated fair trade premium as the dependent variable. Columns 4-6 have the indicator for a positive
fair trade premium as dependent variable. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Table 22: OLS regressions of willingness-to-pay differences on attitudes, excluding 6 newly recruited participants
fair trade premium premium> 0
all private public all private public
coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value
shopping helps 0.1555∗ 0.0295 0.2886∗ 0.0376 0.0322 0.3761 0.2621∗∗ 0.0060 0.2847+ 0.0625 0.2400+ 0.0732
social pressure 0.0146 0.8447 0.0458 0.6742 -0.1394∗ 0.0272 -0.0036 0.9702 0.0734 0.5497 -0.2875 0.1532
FT knowledge -0.2022∗ 0.0290 -0.2229 0.1042 0.1053 0.1723 -0.0527 0.6465 -0.0908 0.5356 0.2249 0.3840
const. 0.1672∗ 0.0186 0.2457+ 0.0617 0.0665+ 0.0917 0.5177∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.5483∗∗ 0.0015 0.4315∗∗ 0.0056
N 30 16 14 30 16 14
R2 0.264 0.410 0.455 0.257 0.277 0.434
Notes: OLS regression. OLS regression. Columns 1-3 have the stated fair trade premium as the dependent variable. Columns 4-6 have the
indicator for a positive fair trade premium as dependent variable. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 23: Probability of fair consumer behavior measured by BuySomeBW and BuyMoreBW
regressed on attitudes and market characteristics.
BuySomeBW BuySomeBW BuyMoreBW BuyMoreBW
coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value
shopping helps 0.0568 0.3040 0.0511 0.3472 0.0666∗ 0.0264 0.0683∗ 0.0201
social pressure 0.0849 0.1634 0.0935 0.1175 -0.0147 0.6083 -0.0126 0.6467
FT knowledge -0.1296∗∗ 0.0095 -0.1319∗∗ 0.0073 -0.0124 0.6360 -0.0175 0.4929
∆p -0.0266∗∗ 0.0077 -0.0164∗ 0.0267
∆w 0.0031 0.7608 0.0181∗ 0.0200
const. 0.4574∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.5518∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.1420∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.1496∗∗∗ 0.0000
N 319 319 319 319
R2 overall 0.0525 0.1170 0.0452 0.0788
Notes: Random effects model with robust standard errors clustered on subject. ∆w and ∆p
denote the difference in wages and prices between the two firms. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗
p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Table 24: Fair consumer behavior measured by FairShare regressed on attitudes and market
characteristics.
FairShare FairShare
coef. p-value coef. p-value
shopping helps 0.0511 0.1217 0.0495 0.1208
social pressure 0.0091 0.7715 0.0123 0.6748
FT knowledge -0.0564∗ 0.0466 -0.0589∗ 0.0313
∆p -0.0163∗∗ 0.0083
∆w 0.0098 0.1143





Notes: Random effects model with robust standard errors clustered on subject. ∆w and ∆p
denote the difference in wages and prices between the two firms. + p < 0.1, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗
p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
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C.8 Results with the absolute values of the fair trade premium
Table 25: Probability of fair consumer behavior measured by BuySomeBW and BuyMoreBW
regressed on market characteristics and the fair trade premium in part 3.
BuySomeBW BuySomeBW BuyMoreBW BuyMoreBW
coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value
FT premium 0.1906 0.1908 0.1837 0.2129 0.0632 0.2940 0.0579 0.3132
∆p -0.0261∗∗ 0.0087 -0.0162∗ 0.0190
∆w 0.0023 0.8212 0.0166∗ 0.0281
const. 0.4223∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.5177∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.1326∗∗∗ 0.0002 0.1453∗∗∗ 0.0008
N 319 319 319 319
R2 overall 0.0254 0.0822 0.0049 0.0352
Notes: Random effects model with robust standard errors clustered on subject. FT premium
is the value of the stated fair trade premium in part 3. ∆w and ∆p denote the difference in
wages and prices between the two firms. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Table 26: Fair consumer behavior measured byFairShare regressed on market characteristics
and the fair trade premium in part 3.
FairShare FairShare
coef. p-value coef. p-value
FT premium 0.1018 0.2027 0.0957 0.2163
∆p -0.0162∗∗ 0.0074
∆w 0.0092 0.1318
const. 0.1978∗∗∗ 0.0000 0.2332∗∗∗ 0.0000
N 316 316
R2 overall 0.0214 0.0789
Notes: Random effects model with robust standard errors clustered on subject. FT premium
is the value of the stated fair trade premium in part 3. ∆w and ∆p denote the difference in
wages and prices between the two firms. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
37
C.9 Consumer decisions in market experiment and fair trade premium - split
up by treatment in part 3
Table 27: Probability of fair consumer behavior measured by BuySomeBW regressed on mar-
ket characteristics and an indicator of a positive fair trade premium in part 3, split up by
private/public treatment.
BuySomeBW BuySomeBW
private public private public
coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value
premium 0.3701∗ 0.0376 0.3436∗ 0.0117 0.3602∗ 0.0451 0.3481∗∗ 0.0062
∆p -0.0103 0.2157 -0.0535∗∗∗ 0.0000
∆w -0.0164 0.2512 0.0277∗ 0.0250
const. 0.2837∗ 0.0396 0.2390∗∗ 0.0076 0.3738∗ 0.0132 0.3485∗∗∗ 0.0001
N 162 157 162 157
R2 overall 0.0980 0.1416 0.1123 0.2568
Notes: Random effects model with robust standard errors clustered on subject. ∆w and ∆p
denote the difference in wages and prices between the two firms. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, **
p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Table 28: Probability of fair consumer behavior measured by BuyMoreBW regressed on mar-
ket characteristics and an indicator of a positive fair trade premium in part 3, split up by
private/public treatment.
BuyMoreBW BuyMoreBW
private public private public
coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value
premium 0.1800∗∗ 0.0082 0.1799∗ 0.0401 0.1664∗∗ 0.0072 0.1788∗ 0.0405
∆p -0.0131 0.1816 -0.0196∗∗∗ 0.0003
∆w 0.0199 0.1359 0.0148∗ 0.0496
const. 0.0240 0.2803 0.0626 0.2888 0.0270 0.3869 0.0885 0.1565
N 162 157 162 157
R2 overall 0.0601 0.0599 0.0900 0.0796
Notes: Random effects model with robust standard errors clustered on subject. ∆w and ∆p
denote the difference in wages and prices between the two firms. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, **
p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
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Table 29: Probability of fair consumer behavior measured by FairShare regressed on market char-
acteristics and an indicator of a positive fair trade premium in part 3, split up by private/public
treatment.
FairShare FairShare
private public private public
coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value coef. p-value
premium 0.1938∗ 0.0172 0.1924∗ 0.0423 0.1824∗ 0.0214 0.1946∗ 0.0326
∆p -0.0101 0.1292 -0.0257∗∗∗ 0.0000
∆w 0.0088 0.3584 0.0142+ 0.0508
const. 0.1040+ 0.0618 0.1167+ 0.0821 0.1247∗ 0.0181 0.1663∗ 0.0137
N 159 157 159 157
R2 overall 0.0822 0.0962 0.1167 0.1652
Notes: Random effects model with robust standard errors clustered on subject. ∆w and ∆p
denote the difference in wages and prices between the two firms. + p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, **
p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
D Statistics and figures at the consumer-period level
Table 30: Average of BuySomeBW and BuyMoreBW at the consumer-period level split up by
the chocolate choice in part 1 of the experiment.
BuySomeBW BuyMoreBW FairShare N
conv. 0.3091 0.0364 0.1229 110
(0.4642) (0.1881) (0.2193)
FT 0.6364 0.2201 0.3070 209
(0.4822) (0.4153) (0.3089)
Notes: FT and conv. denote choice of fair trade and conventional chocolate, respectively.
Standard deviations in parentheses. Multiple observations per consumer. FairShare has 108
observations for conventional choosers and 208 for fair trade choosers.
Table 31: Average of BuySomeBW and BuyMoreBW at the consumer-period level split up by
the fair trade premium stated in part 3 of the experiment being positive or not.
BuySomeBW BuyMoreBW FairShare N
premium≤ 0 0.3150 0.0472 0.1358 127
(0.4663) (0.2130 ) (0.2460)
premium> 0 0.6615 0.2292 0.3149 192
(0.4745) (0.4214) (0.3025)
Notes: Standard deviations in parentheses. Multiple observations per consumer. FairShare
has 125 observations for participants with a zero or negative fair trade premium and 191 for






































































(c) Average of FairShare.
Figure 4: Differences of fair purchasing behavior by chocolate choice. N = 319 (N = 316 for
FairShare), thereof 110 (108) market interactions with a conventional chooser and 209 (208)
market interactions with a fair trade chooser. The y-axis displays the average of the respective






































































(c) Average of FairShare.
Figure 5: Differences of fair purchasing behavior by premium. N = 319 (N = 316 for FairShare),
thereof 192 (191) market interactions of consumers with a positive fair trade premium and 127
(125) market interactions with a consumer with a zero or negative fair trade premium. The y-
axis displays the average of the respective variable over all situations with a high-wage-high-price
firm at the consumer-period level
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